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In  this  paper  we  propose  an  artificial  stock  market  model  based  on 
interaction  of  heterogeneous  agents  whose  forward-looking  behaviour  is 
driven  by  the  reinforcement  learning  algorithm  combined  with  some 
evolutionary  selection  mechanism.  We  use  the  model  for  the  analysis  of 
market  self-regulation  abilities,  market  efficiency  and  determinants  of 
emergent properties of the financial market. Distinctive and novel features of 
the  model include strong emphasis on the economic content of individual 
decision  making,  application  of  the  Q-learning  algorithm  for  driving 
individual behaviour, and rich market setup. 
Keywords: Agent-based financial modelling, artificial stock market, complex 
dynamical  system,  emergent  properties,  market  efficiency,  agent 
heterogeneity, reinforcement learning. 
JEL classification: G10, G11, G14. 
Santrauka 
Šiame  straipsnyje  pateikiamas  dirbtin÷s  akcijų  rinkos  modelis,  pagrįstas 
heterogeninių  agentų s ąveika.  Ateities  galimybių  vertinimu  pasižyminčią
agentų elgseną lemia skatinamojo mokymosi algoritmas, taikomas kartu su 
evoliucine  agentų  atranka.  Modelis  n÷ra  tiesiogiai  taikomas  empirinei 
analizei, jis vertintinas kaip struktūrizuotos analiz÷s pagrindas, tiriant rinkos 
savireguliacijos galimybes, rinkos efektyvumą bei kylančias rinkos savybes 
lemiančius  veiksnius.  Lyginant  su  daugeliu  kitų  dirbtin÷s  akcijų  rinkos 
modelių,  šiame  modelyje  ekonominei  individų  elgsenai  ir  individualiai 
adaptacijai skiriamas gerokai didesnis d÷mesys. Riboto racionalumo agentai 
šiame  modelyje  investicinius  sprendimus  grindžia  ekonomine  logika,  t.y. 
vertindami tik÷tinus diskontuotus pajamų srautus bei lygindami alternatyvių
investicijų  grąžas.  Jie  taip  pat  siekia  tinkamai  vertinti  ateitį  dideliu 
neapibr÷žtumu pasižyminčioje aplinkoje bei atsižvelgia į kitų rinkos dalyvių
veiksmų  poveikį  bendrai  rinkos  kainos  dinamikai.  Šis  darbas  yra  vienas 
pirmųjų  bandymų  ekonominiu  požiūriu  įdomų  skatinamojo  mokymosi 
algoritmą  (konkrečiau,  Q-mokymąsi)  dirbtin÷s  akcijų  rinkos  modeliuose. 






















































































































In this paper we develop an artificial stock market (ASM) model, which could be used to 
examine some emergent features of a complex system comprised of a large number of 
heterogeneous  learning  agents  that  interact  in  a  detail-rich  and  realistically  designed 
environment. This version of the model is not calibrated to empirical data, so at this stage 
the main aim of this research is to offer, implement and test some new ideas that could 
lay ground for a robust framework for analysis of financial market processes and their 
determinants. We believe that the model does offer an interesting framework for the 
structured analysis of market processes without abstracting from relevant and important 
features,  such  as  an  explicit  trading  process,  regular  dividend  payouts,  trading  costs, 
agent  heterogeneity,  dissemination  of  experience,  competitive  behaviour,  agent 
prevalence  and forced  exit,  etc.  Of  course,  some  of  these  aspects  have  already  been 
incorporated in existing agent-based financial models. However, the lack of the widely 
accepted  fundament  in  this  area  of  modelling  necessitates  the  individual  and  largely 
independent approach, which is pursued in this study. 
One of distinctive features of the proposed agent-based model is a strong emphasis on 
economic  behaviour  of  individual  agents.  In  the  proposed  model  boundedly  rational 
agents base their decisions on economic considerations, such as estimation of discounted 
earnings  and  comparison  of  returns  on  different  investment  strategies,  and  pursue 
forward-looking  behaviour  in  highly  uncertain  environment.  Agents’  individual 
adaptation, intertemporal decision making and forward-looking behaviour in the multi-
agent setting is governed by reinforcement learning technique borrowed from the field of 
machine learning. To our knowledge, this work is one of the first attempts to apply the 
reinforcement learning techniques in an ASM model. Also, this is apparently the first 
full-fledged artificial stock market model in the Lithuanian economic literature. 
By conducting simulation experiments in this model, we aim to address some specific 
questions, such as market self-regulation abilities, the congruence between the market 
price  of  the  stock  and  its  fundamentals  (the  market  efficiency  issue),  importance  of 
intelligent  individual  behaviour  and  interaction  at  the  population  level  for  market 
efficiency and functioning, and relationship between stock prices and market liquidity. It 
should be stressed, however, that at this stage the model should largely be seen as a 
thought  experiment  that  proposes  to  study  financial  market  processes  in  the  light  of 
complex  interaction  of  artificial  agents  acting  an  economically  appealing  way. 
Nevertheless,  the  proposed  modelling  approach  serves  as  a  basis  for  a  refined  and 
suitable for empirical analysis version of the model, which is developed in Ramanauskas 
(2009). 
The paper is organised as follows. We provide a detailed description of model’s main 
building  blocks  and  basic  internal  processes  in  Section  2.  Section  3  describes 
implemented  simulation  experiments  and  discusses  results  of  model  simulation  in 
controlled environment. Section 4 concludes. The paper also contains two appendices. In 
Appendix 1, basic principles of reinforcement learning algorithm (more specifically, Q-



















































selected simulation graphs are given in Appendix 2. Since the current paper is an integral 
part of our broader research effort, we do not provide a review of the related literature but 




The ASM research area is relatively new but there is a growing body of literature on the 
subject. There is a clear lack of the comprehensive literature review and classification of 
existing models. Some popular models and ASM modelling principles are presented in 
LeBaron (2006), Samanidou et al. (2007) have a review of some agent-based financial 
models, with the emphasis on econophysics. At the heart of ASM models lies interaction 
of  heterogeneous  agents,  which  leads  to  complex  systemic  behaviour  and  emergent 
systemic properties. There are two broad classes of ASM models, namely, models based 
on agents’ hard-wired behavioural rules (see, e.g. Kim and Markowitz (1989), Sethi and 
Franke  (1995),  Lux  (1995))  and  models  supporting  systemic  adaptation.  The  most 
prominent  example  of  the  latter  category  is  the  Santa  Fe  ASM  model  developed  by 
Arthur et al. (1997); also see, e.g. Beltrati and Margarita (1992), Lettau (1997), LeBaron 
(2000), Tay and Linn (2001). See Ramanauskas (2009) for a general discussion about 
agent-based financial modelling and the abovementioned models. 
An important caveat of many ASM models is that systemic adaptation often relies 
merely  on  evolutionary  search  algorithms.  This  means  that  systemic  dynamics,  e.g. 
trading and market price formation is generated by simply ensuring the sufficient variety 
of investment strategies and inducing some sort of evolutionary selection of strategies in 
favour to those that give highest utility to individuals. Such approach often downplays the 
importance of individual behaviour, which is often assumed to be driven by simplistic 
rules. Also, these algorithms generally do not support forward-looking behaviour except 
special cases, in which agents try to achieve myopic one-period optimisation. Unlike 
neoclassical financial theories, most existing agent-based models are not well-suited to 
model the intertemporal choice and hence miss a crucial aspect of financial decision 
making. 
In  our  view,  agents  should  exhibit  economically  interesting  behaviour  and  retain 
elements of economic reasoning rather than constitute mere collections of behavioural 
rules  Hence,  the  present  ASM  model  does  not  fully  abstract  from  many  important 
features of real financial markets that are usually omitted both from standard financial 
models and other ASMs. For example, just like in the real world financial markets, agents 
in this ASM do not know the “true model” but try instead to adapt in the highly uncertain 
environment, they exhibit bounded rationality, non-myopic forward-looking behaviour, 
as well as diversity in experience and skill levels; the trading process is quite realistic and 





















































































































as a fundamental force driving stock prices is explicitly recognised. In this section we 
present the architecture of the artificial stock market in detail. 

The  artificial  stock  market  is  populated  by  a  large  number  of  heterogeneous 
reinforcement-learning investors. Investors differ in their financial holdings, expectations 
regarding dividend prospects or fundamental stock value. This ensures diverse investor 
behaviour even though the basic principles governing experience accumulation are the 
same  across  population.  We  can  summarise  agents’  basic  behavioural  principles  as 
follows. All agents forecast an exogenously given, unknown dividend process and base 
their estimates of the fundamental stock value on dividend prospects. These estimates are 
intelligently  adjusted  to  attain  immediate  reservation  prices.  Agents  explore  the 
environment  and  accumulate  the  experience  with  the  aim  of  maximising  long-term 
returns on their investment portfolios but there are no optimality guaranties against the 
background of high uncertainty and complex interaction of agents. 
Figure 1. Main building blocks of the ASM model 
Forming private forecasts of exogenously generated dividends 
Based on: 
 Exponential moving average  
 Adjustment  as  a  result  of  reinforcement  learning  (agents  seek  to  minimise 
forecast errors) 
Making individual estimates of fundamental stock value and its reservation price 
Based on: 
 Discounted expected dividend flows 
 Adjustment  as  a  result  of  reinforcement  learning  (agents  seek  to  maximise 
portfolio returns) 
Making individual trading decisions  
Based on: 
 Private estimates of fundamentals, 
 Maximisation of expected individual wealth at the end of a trading period 
 Publicly announced estimated probabilities of successful trades for given prices
Carrying out trades via the centralised exchange and collecting trading statistics 
Based on: 
 Double auction system 
 Simultaneous  submission  of  trade  orders  and  random  queuing  of  individual 
orders
Learning to forecast dividends and learning about fundamental stock value 
Based on: 
 Standard Q-learning with linear gradient-descent approximation
Augmenting learning processes by specific interaction among agents (optional) 
Based on: 
 Successful strategy imitation 
 Evolutionary  selection  and  resultant  prevalence  of  successful  investment 
strategies 



















































As usual in financial market modelling, the modelled financial market is very simple. 
Only one, dividend-paying stock (stock index) is traded on the market. Dividends are 
generated by an exogenous stochastic process unknown to the agents, and they are paid 
out in regular intervals. The number of trading rounds between dividend payouts can be 
set arbitrarily, which enables interpretation of a trading round as a day, a week, a month, 
etc. Paid out dividends and funds needed for liquidity purposes are held in private bank 
accounts  and  earn  constant  interest  rates,  whereas  liquidity  exceeding  some  arbitrary 
threshold is simply removed from the system (e.g., consumed). Borrowing is not allowed. 
Initially agents are endowed with arbitrary stock and cash holdings, and subsequently in 
every trading round each of them may submit a limit order to buy or sell one unit of 
stock, provided, of course, that financial constraints are non-binding. Trading takes place 
via the centralised exchange. 
For the ease of detailed model exposition, it is useful to break the model into a set of 
economically meaningful processes, though some of them are inter-related in complex 
ways. The general structure of the model is laid out in Figure 1. We will discuss these 
logical building blocks in the following subsections. 

Expected company earnings and dividend payouts are the main fundamental determinants 
of the intrinsic stock value. Even though in standard models based on the efficient market 
hypothesis corporate earnings and dividend dynamics are not forecasted explicitly, it is 
usually implicitly assumed that some market players do conduct fundamental analysis, 
which  ultimately  gets  reflected  in  stock  prices.  Hence,  the  fundamental  analysis  of 
earnings perspectives does matter. It is only that some theories are willing to go so far as 
to assume that communication among market participants is efficient enough for most 
investors not to bother inquiring into companies’ financial books. 
Here we propose the view that in the uncertain environment investors (i) form their 
individual beliefs about the risk-neutral value of a risky stock as some basic value anchor, 
(ii) acknowledge that the market price of the stock may fluctuate about or systemically 
differ from individual risk-neutral fundamentals due to various factors, such as investors’ 
risk preferences, animal spirits or heterogeneity of beliefs, and (iii) flexibly determine 
their  individual  reservation  prices  in  the  process  of  adaptive  interaction  with  the 
environment. The inertia of  beliefs about  future  prospects, as  well  as  the  entirety  of 
individual incentives and reward structures then determine market’s aggregate attitude 
toward risk and, consequently, result in episodes of market euphoria or pessimism. 
We  assume  that  all  agents  make  their  private  forecasts  of  dividend  dynamics. 
Dividend  flows  generated  by  an  unknown,  potentially  non-stationary  data  generating 
process specified by a modeller. The only information, upon which agents can base their 
forecasts, is past realisation of dividends, and agents know nothing about stationarity of 
the  data  generating  process.  Hence,  they  are  assumed  to  form  adaptive  expectations, 





















































































































improve a given agent’s forecasting ability by probabilistic imitation of more successful 
individuals’ behaviour (see Section 2.6 for more on this). 
Agents start with determining basic reference points for their dividend forecasts. The 
exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) of realised dividend payouts can be 
calculated as follows: 




y i d d d − − + ⋅ = λ λ        ( 1 )  
Here  y d   denotes  dividends  paid  out  in  period  y  (year)  and  1 λ   is  the  arbitrary 
smoothing factor (the same for all agents), which is a real number between 0 and 1. The 
subscript i on the averaged dividends in equation (1) to indicates that they vary across the 
population  of  agents.  The  differences  arise  due  to  different  arbitrarily  chosen  initial 
values but over time, however, these exponential averages converge to each other. Also 
note that dividend payouts can be arbitrarily less frequent than stock trading rounds, e.g. 
if one trading period equals one month, dividends may be scheduled to be paid out every 
twelve periods and in equation (1) one time unit would be one year.  
Exponential  moving  averages  would  clearly  be  unacceptable  estimates  of  future 
dividends in a general case. Hence, their function in this model is twofold. First, they 
provide  a  basis  for  further  “intelligent”  refinement  of  dividend  forecasts,  i.e.  these 
moving averages are multiplied by some adjustment factors calibrated in the process of 
the reinforcement learning. And second, forecasting dividends relative to their moving 
averages,  as  opposed  to  forecasting  dividend  levels  directly,  makes  forecasting 
environment more stationary, which facilitates the reinforcement learning task. 
The n-period dividend forecast is given by the following equation: 




y i n y i a d d E ⋅ = +         ( 2 )  
where  y i a ,  is agent i’s dividend adjustment factor. These adjustment factors are gradually 
changed as agents explore and exploit their accumulated experience, with the long-term 
aim to minimize squared forecast errors. The detailed description of the reinforcement 
learning procedure is provided in Section 2.6 and Appendix  1. Individual forecasts for 
periods y + 1, …, y + n formed in periods y – n + 1, …, y, respectively, are stored in the 
program and used for determining individual estimates of the fundamental stock value. 

Quite similarly to the dividend forecasting procedure, agents’ estimation of the intrinsic 
stock  value  is  a  two-stage  process.  It  embraces  formation  of  initial  estimates  of  the 
fundamental  value,  based  on  discounted  dividend  flows,  and  ensuing  intelligent 
adjustment grounded on agents’ interaction with environment. We refer to this refined 
fundamental value as the reservation price. 
The initial evaluation of the future dividend flows is a simple discounting exercise. To 
calculate the present value of expected dividend stream, the constant interest rate is used 
as the discount factor. Moreover, beyond the forecast horizon dividends are assumed to 
remain constant. Under these assumptions, individual estimates of the present value of 




















































































E d v      ( 3 )  
where  r   is  the  constant  interest  rate.  The  last  term  in  this  equation  is  simply  the 
discounted value of the infinite sum of steady financial inflows. These present value 
estimates are subject to further refinement. 
To avoid excessive volatility of the estimates of the discounted value of dividend 
stream,  they  are  again  smoothed  by  calculating  the  exponentially  weighted  moving 
averages: 






y i v v v − − + ⋅ = λ λ        ( 4 )  
The  role  of  these  averages  is  very  similar  to  that  of  the  averaged  dividends  in  the 
dividend forecasting process, namely, to provide some background for the reinforcement 
learning procedure and (partially) stationarise the environment in which agents try to 
adapt. 
The second stage in the estimation of the individual reservation prices of the stock is 
calibration based on the reinforcement learning procedure. For this we have to switch to 
the different time frame (in the base version of the model it is assumed that dividends are 
paid out annually, whereas agents can trade once per month). In a given trading round t, 
individual  reservation  prices 
reserve
tiv ,   are  obtained  from  equation  (4)  by  multiplying 
exponentially smoothed estimates of fundamental value by individual price adjustment 
factors, 
p
tia , : 






ti a v v ⋅ =          ( 5 )  
In this context the individual reservation price is understood as an agent’s subjective 
assessment of the stock’s intrinsic value that prompts immediate agent’s response (to buy 
or sell the security). 

Having formed their individual beliefs about the fundamental value of the stock price, 
agents have to make specific portfolio rebalancing decisions. In principle, they weigh 
their own assessment of the stock against market perceptions and make orders to buy 
(sell)  one  unit  of  the  underpriced  (overpriced)  stock  at  the  price  that  is  expected  to 
maximise  their  wealth  at  the  end  of  the  trading  period.  We  give  a  more  detailed 
description of these processes below. 
The individual reservation price reflects what investors think the stock price should be 
worth. If the last period’s average market price  1 − t p  is less than agent i’s reservation 
price  today,  it  is  willing  to  buy  stock  and  pay  at  most 
reserve
tiv , .  Conversely,  if  the 
prevailing market price is higher than the agent’s perceived fundamental, it is willing to 
sell it at 
reserve
tiv ,  or higher price. So its decision rule is like this: 
If  1 , − > t
reserve
ti p v  and 
0























































































































if  1 , − < t
reserve
ti p v  and  0
0
, > tih → submit limit order to sell 1 share at price
q
tip ,
otherwise, make no order.
Here 
0
,tih  and 
0
,ti m  denote, respectively, agent i’s stock holdings (i.e. number of owned 
shares) and cash balance at the beginning of a trading round, 
q
tip ,  is the quoted price to be 
determined below. 
We would not expect real world investors to make orders to buy or sell the stock 
precisely at reservation prices because in that case they would miss potentially profitable 
asset  allocation opportunities. The  real  world  investor  whose perception  of the  stock 
value considerably differs from the average market opinion is likely to take advantage of 
market liquidity and make an order to trade at a price close the prevailing market price 
rather than to his own reservation price. But what price would it be? There is no answer 
in the theory. The first obvious step, implemented in the model, is to allow limit orders, 
i.e. orders to trade the security at a specified or better price. Given the complexity of the 
agent  interaction,  the  optimal  pricing  solution  generally  cannot  be  found.  Thus  we 
proceed in the following, intuitively appealing way: (i) we determine the possible price 
quote grid around the prevailing market price (i.e. determine tick sizes and possible price 
fluctuation bands), (ii) estimate aggregate supply and demand schedules, (iii) compute 
each individual’s expected end-of-period wealth for every possible trading price and (iv) 
allow  agents  to  make  trading  decisions  that  maximise  their  expected  end-of-period 
wealth. 
Agents, of course, aim at getting most favourable prices for their trades but they must 
take  into  account  the  fact  that  better  bid  or  ask  prices  are  generally  associated  with 
smaller probabilities of successful trades. The assumption that each agent is allowed to 
trade only one unit of stock in a given trading round has a very useful implication in this 
context – the probabilities of successful trades at all possible prices faced by a buyer and 
a seller can be loosely interpreted as the supply and demand schedules, respectively. So 
we further assume that these supply and demand schedules are estimated by the exchange 
institution from past trading data and constitute public knowledge. 
Estimated  probabilities  of  successful  trades  at  given  (relative)  price  quotes  are 
computed as follows. Simply put, these estimated probabilities should indicate chances of 
successful trading at prices that are “high” or “low” relative to the prevailing market price 
(i.e. last period’s average price). So the probability of the successful trade for a given 
price quote (relative to the benchmark price) is calculated from the past trading rounds as 
a fraction of successfully filled buy (sell) orders out of all submitted orders to buy (sell) 
at that price. Unfortunately, due to computational constraints the number of agents and 
successful trades is not sufficiently high to obtain reliable estimated probabilities in this 
straightforward way. For this reason we employ the following three-step procedure: 
i) estimates of probabilities of successful buy and sell orders for every price quote are 
smoothed over time by computing exponential moving averages; 
ii) if there are no orders to buy or sell at a given price at time t, the exponential moving 



















































iii) the scattered estimates are fitted to a simple cross-sectional regression line (with its 
values  restricted  to  lie  in  the  interval  between  0  and  1)  to  ensure  that  the  sets  of 
successful trade probabilities retain meaningful economic properties. 









































Probability of successful buy order Probability of successful sell order
As  a  result,  we  get a  nice  upward-sloping  line,  which represents  probabilities  of 
successful buy orders for each possible price quote, and a downward-sloping line for the 
sell  orders  case.  Figure  2  shows  a  typical  example  of  estimated  probabilities  of 
successfully  buying  and selling  one  unit  of  stock  at  all  possible  prices (last period’s 
average price set equal to 25 in this relative pricing grid). This particular example reflects 
an upward-trending market, in which agents reckon they have higher chances (estimated 
at around 60%) of selling the stock than buying it (estimated at around 40%) at the last 
period’s average price. 
At this stage agents have all the components needed to choose prices that give them 
highest  expected  wealth  at  the  end  of  the  trading  round.  First,  agent  i  estimates  its 
expected end-of-period stock holdings (i.e. the number of shares) for each possible price 
quote j: 




, ,   for all j.        ( 6 )  
Here  ) ( , , tj i q E  denotes of expected number of shares to be bought or sold by agent i at 
any quotable price j (as was explained above, these numbers lie in the closed interval 
between 0 and 1).  The indicator variable  i b  takes value of 1 if the agent is willing to buy 
the stock or  –1 if it is willing to sell the stock. 
Similarly,  agent  i’s  expected  end-of-period  cash  holdings  for  each  possible  price 
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, , ti tj i i tj tj i ti tj i d E h E c b x q E m m E ⋅ + − − ⋅ ⋅ + =   for all j.   (7) 
Here  tj x ,  denotes possible price quote j, c is the fractional trading cost and  ) ( ,ti d E
denotes the expected dividends, which are to be paid out following the trading round (this 
term equals zero in between the dividend payout periods). It is important to note here that 
the interest on spare cash funds is paid, as well as excess liquidity (cash holdings above 
some prespecified amount needed for trading) is taken away, at the beginning of the 
trading period. All of this is reflected in  .
0
,ti m  Dividends are paid out for those agents that 
hold stocks after the trading round, as can be seen from equation (7). 
Finally, agent i’s expected end-of-period stock holdings are valued at the individual 
reservation price and each agent calculates its expected end-of-period wealth for every 
possible price quote: 






, , tj i
reserve
ti tj i tj i m E v h E w E + ⋅ =        ( 8 )  
Hence,  agent  i’s  quoted  price,  ,
q
i p   is  the  price  that  is  associated  with  the  highest 
expected wealth at the end of the trading round: 





i w E p
i

=          ( 9 )  
If several price quotes result in the same expected wealth, the agent chooses randomly 
among them. It is also important to note that in the process of the reinforcement learning, 
agents are occasionally forced to take exploratory actions. In those cases exploring agents 
choose prices from the quote grid in a random manner.  
Market  price  determination  and  actual  trading  take  place  on  the  centralised  stock 
exchange. The trading mechanism basically is the double auction system, in which both 
buyers and sellers contemporaneously submit their competitive orders to implement their 
trades.  Agents  are  assumed  to  have  no  knowledge  of  individual  market  participants’ 
submitted orders. 
In this model the order book mechanism works as follows. Prior to a trading round, all 
agents’  trade  orders  are  queued  randomly  and  then  each  of  them  undergoes  the 
processing procedure. During this procedure, for an order that is being processed all 
earlier-queued orders are scanned in search for the most favourable matching (opposite) 
order.  If  such  an  order  is  found (a  tie among  several equally  good  orders is  broken 
arbitrarily), the trade is executed at the average of the bid and ask price. Otherwise, the 
order remains open until it makes a match for other subsequently processed orders or 
until the end of the trading period, when it is closed as an unexecuted order. Following 
the trading round, all agents’ cash and securities accounts are updated accordingly. 
The centralised stock exchange also produces a number of trading statistics, both for 
analytical and computational purposes. These statistics include the market price, trading 
volumes and volatility measures. The market price in a given trading period is calculated 
as the average traded price. As was mentioned before, it is crucially important for making 





















































Let  us  now  turn  to  the  learning  process  through  which  individual  agents’  pricing 
considerations,  attitudes  to  risk  and,  more  generally,  goal-oriented  behaviours  are 
determined. Quite some learning methods are known, ranging from psychology-based 
models (stimulus-response, belief-based conscious learning, associative learning, etc.) to 
rationality-based  methods  (Beyesian,  least-squares  learning)  to  artificial  intelligence 
approaches  (evolutionary  algorithms,  replicator  dynamics,  neural  nets,  reinforcement 
learning). For an overview of popular learning algorithms see, e.g., Brenner (2006). As 
Brenner notes, virtually all of the learning models used in economic contexts are largely 
ad hoc, based only on introspection, common sense, artificial intelligence research or 
psychological findings. 
We assume that agents’ behaviour is driven by reinforcement learning since these 
learning  algorithms  borrowed  from  the  machine  learning  literature  seem  to  be 
conceptually  suitable  for  modelling  investor  behaviour.  Agents  take  actions  in  the 
uncertain environment and obtain immediate rewards associated with these (and possibly 
previous)  actions.  A  specific  learning  algorithm  allows  agents  to  adjust  their  action 
policies in pursuit of highest long-term rewards. It is a very desirable feature of any 
financial model that agents strive for strategic, as opposed to myopic, behaviour. The 
reinforcement-learning  agents  do  just  that.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  the  immense 
complexity  of  investors’  interaction,  both  in  real  world  financial  markets  and  in  the 
model, that dramatically limits agents’ abilities to actually achieve optimal investment 
policies if not makes the optimal investment behaviour outright impossible. 
In our model we use a popular reinforcement learning algorithm, also known as the 
Q-learning, which was initially proposed by Watkins (1989). It is the temporal difference 
learning based on the step-wise update (or back-up) of the action-value function and 
associated adjustment of behavioural policies (a more detailed exposition of basic Q-
learning principles is given in Appendix 1). The principal back-up rule is closely related 
to Bellman optimality property and takes the following form: 
.) ) , ( max ( ) , ( ) 1( ) , (
) , (     of      estimate New  
1 1
) , (    of     estimate    Old            
t t
t t a s Q
t a t
a s Q
t t t t a s Q r a s Q a s Q + + + + ⋅ − ← γ α α     (10) 
Here  t s  denotes the state of environment,  t a  is the action taken in period t and  1 + t r  is 
the immediate reward associated with action  t a  (and possibly earlier actions). Parameter 
α  is known as the learning rate and γ  is the discount rate of future rewards. Function 
) , ( t t a s Q is  usually  referred  to  as  the  action-value  function  (or  Q-function)  and  it 
basically shows the value of taking action  t a  in state  t s  under behavioural policy  . π
More  specifically,  the  action-value  function  is  the  expected  cumulative  reward 
conditional on the current state, action and pursued behavioural policy.  
However,  the  so-called  “curse  of  dimensionality”  implies  that  the  straightforward 
implementation of the basic version of this algorithm is rarely possible in complicated 





















































































































gradient-descent approximation, which is briefly presented in Appendix 1. Here we only 
describe specific variables that are used in the Q-learning algorithm. 
As was mentioned before, there are two instances of individual agent learning in the 
model: learning to forecast dividends and learning to adjust perceived fundamentals. In 
the dividend forecasting case agent i learns to adjust the dividend adjustment factor, 
div
tia , (see equation (2)). In each state there are three possible actions – the agent can 
increase the dividend adjustment factor by a small proportion specified by the modeller, 
decrease it by the same amount or leave it unchanged.  
Due to the complex nature of environment, the state of the world – as perceived by 
investor i –  must  be  approximated,  and  it  is  described  by  a  vector  of so-called  state 
features,  s φ

(see Figure A1.2 in Appendix 1). We choose four state features that are 
indicative of the reinforcement learner’s “location” in the environment and summarize 
some  properties  of  the  dividend-generating  process,  which  can  provide  basis  for 
successful forecasting. These features include the size of the dividend adjustment factor, 
relative  deviation  of  current  dividend  from  its  EWMA  (compared  to  the  standard 
deviation), the square of this deviation (to allow for nonlinear relation with forecasts) and 
the size of the current dividend relative to the EWMA.  
The forecast decision is taken at time y and the actual dividend realisation is known at 
forecast horizon y + n. Then agent i gets the reward, which is the negative of the squared 
forecast error: 
( ) . ) (
2
, , n y i y n y
d
n y i d E d r + + + − − =         ( 1 1 )  
Hence,  the  agent  is  punished  for  the  forecasting  errors.  The  learning  process  is 
augmented by modeller-imposed constraints on dividend forecasts. The forecast is not 
allowed to deviate by more than a prespecified threshold (e.g. 30%) from the current 
level of dividends. In that case, the agent gets extra-punishment and the dividend forecast 
is forced to be marginally closer to the current dividend level. Once the agent observes 
the resultant state, i.e. the actual dividend realisation, it updates its behavioural policy 
according to the Q-learning procedure. 
In the case of the individual stock value estimation, agent i also can take one of three 
actions:  fractionally  increase  or  decrease  the  price  adjustment  factor, 
p
tia ,   (see 
equation (5)), or leave it unchanged. Analogously to the dividend forecasting case, the 
four  state  features  are  the  price  adjustment  factor, the  stock  price  deviation  from  its 
exponential time-average (this difference is divided by the standard deviation), the square 
of this deviation and the current stock price divided by the weighted time-average. 
The agent observes the state of the world and acts according to the pursued policy. 
After the trading round, the agent observes trading results and the resultant state of the 
world, which enables the agent to update its policies according to the usual Q-learning 
procedure. In this model, the basic immediate reward,  , 1 ,
p
tir +  is simply the log-return on 
the agent’s portfolio: 































































Recall that  t p  denotes the market price following a trading round in time t and 
monthly r  is 
a one-period return on bank account. In order to ensure more efficient learning – just like 
in the case of dividend learning – constraints are imposed on the magnitude of price 
adjustment  factors,  and  additional  penalties  are  invoked  if  these  constraints  become 
binding. 
The  chosen  specification  of  the  reward  function  implies  that  the  reinforcement-
learning agents try to learn to organise their behaviour so that they maximise long-term 
returns on their investments. We could interpret agents in this model as professional fund 
managers that care about maximising clients’ wealth, seek best long-term performance 
among  peers  and  shun  under-performance.  They  need  not  to  be  risk-averse,  as  is 
conventionally  assumed  about  individual  consumption-smoothing  investors.  Indeed, 
recent evidence from extremely turbulent financial markets shows that it might well quite 
the opposite – in some cases excessive risk-taking might generate superior performance 
for a prolonged period of time, which in turn generates solid growth in fee income during 
that time. In addition, it should be noted that in the model an agent’s attitude toward risk 
is determined not only by its reward function but also by evolutionary selection and other 
systemic adaptation. 
The model allows for optional alteration of agent behaviour via sharing private trading 
experience,  competitive  evolutionary  selection  and  noise  trading  behaviour.  These 
options help enhance realism of the artificial stock market and arguably augment the 
reinforcement  learning  procedure  by  removing  clearly  dominated  trading  policies 
implemented by individual agents and by strengthening competition among them. 
In our model, dissemination of agents’ experience is very stylised. At the end of each 
period  agents  are  randomly  matched  in  pairs.  In  every  pair,  agents’  long-term 
performance measures, which are cumulative past rewards, are compared to each other. If 
the difference between matched agents’ performance measures is sufficiently large (the 
threshold  level  is  allowed  to  fluctuate  randomly  to  reflect  the  random  nature  of 
knowledge  dissemination),  the  worse-performing  agent  simply  replicates  the  more 
successful agent’s experience. 
Evolutionary  selection  is  another  available  option  in  the  present  ASM  model.  It 
assumes  bankruptcy  of  worst-performing  agents  and  their  replacement  with  best-
performers.  So  agents,  whose  performance  relative  to  the  benchmark  (which  is  the 
average agents’ performance) falls below a modeller-specified threshold, go bankrupt. 
Their place is taken over by best-performers, which then are forced to split so that the 
number  of  agents  remains  constant.  This  has  a  natural  interpretation:  inferior  fund 
managers are forced out of the market as unsatisfied clients bring their wealth over to 
best-performing funds and the latter then have to split for regulatory or any other reasons. 
Successful  agents  are  given  substantial  extra  rewards  in  the  event  of  the  split,  to 
encourage their performance. 
Finally,  the  model  allows  for  noise  trading  behaviour.  Unlike  in  the  evolutionary 
selection, the worst-performers are not replaced by most successful agents. Rather, they 






















































































































Like  the  vast  majority  of other  ASM  models, the  current  model  is  based  on a  large 
number of parameters, and it is very difficult to calibrate the model to match empirical 
data. At this stage of model development we do not attempt to do that. Instead, we assign 
reasonable and, where possible, conventional values to the parameters and assume very 
simple  forms  of  dividend-generating  processes.  This  enables  us  to  determine  the 
approximate fundamental stock value dynamics and study how the market stock price, 
determined by the complex system of interacting heterogeneous agents, fares in relation 
to stock price fundamentals. Even though the model is not calibrated to the market data, 
model results can offer qualitative insights about market self-regulation, efficiency and 
other aspects of market functioning. In this section we examine these issues in more 
detail and report some of the more interesting simulation results. 
The simulation procedure is implemented by performing batches of model runs. Each 
run consists of 20,000 trading rounds (about 1667 years). Batches of ten runs repeated 
under identical parameter settings are used to generate essential data and statistics that are 
in turn used for analysis and generalisation. In every run, the first 5,000 trading rounds – 
as the learning initiation phase – are excluded from the calculation of the descriptive 
statistics  (presented  in  Table  A2.3  in  Appendix  2).  The  simulation  concentrates  on 
altering features of the reinforcement learning, interaction among agents and dividend-
generating  processes  in  an  attempt  to  understand  relative  importance  of  intelligent 
individual  behaviour,  market  setting  and  population-level  changes  for  the  aggregate 
market behaviour. Other model parameters are kept unchanged. Their values are provided 
in Table A2.1. 
Dividends are assumed to fluctuate around an exponential trend and their volatility is 
proportional to the dividend level. The role of the trend is to necessitate the intelligent 
adjustment of dividend estimates, as forecasts based on exponentially-weighted moving 
averages would be clearly biased. Large dividend growth rates can only be sustained over 
relatively short time horizons, and hence in our very long-term model we have to choose 
very low dividend growth rates (e.g. 0.15 % per year). We also examine deterministic 
constant  dividends,  as  a  special  case (see exact specifications  of  dividend  generating 
processes in Table A2.2). 
The primary question addressed in most ASM models is the market efficiency issue. 
Here efficiency is loosely interpreted as the congruence between the stock market price 
and its fundamentals. In the current setting it is not possible to know the right theoretical 
stock price, so we basically want to compare the market stock price with risk-neutral 
estimates of fundamentals. 
Let  us  start  with  the  examination  of  agents’  ability  to  forecast  dividends.  Since 
dividends are driven by very simple data generating processes, it is not surprising that in 
the model version with enabled both reinforcement learning and evolutionary selection 
(Experiment 1 in Table A2.3) agents are able to form very precise forecasts. The average 
dividend forecast error for this model specification is -0.1%, while the average absolute 



















































reinforcement  learning  behaviour  for  dividend  forecasting,  simulation  batches  with 
disabled reinforcement learning are run (Experiment 3). In these runs agents neither learn 
to  forecast  dividends,  nor  try  to  optimise  their  portfolios,  as  their  commensurate 
reinforcement rewards 
d
n tir + ,  and  
p
tir 1 , +  are set to zero. In this case, the average forecast 
bias considerably increases to -0.8% and the average absolute errors stands at 1.4%. In 
this  no-learning  case  the  average  percentage  of  agents  hitting  the  modeller-imposed 
dividend forecast bounds increases significantly, as compared to the enabled learning 
case. In other words, learning agents are able to effectively form “reasonable” forecasts, 
while non-learning agents are simply forced to remain within prespecified boundaries but 
perform much worse, taken on individual basis. This leads us to a very natural conclusion 
that in the dividend forecasting process intelligent adaptation matters.  
As the next step of our analysis we examine dynamics of the market price in relation 
to the fundamentals. In Experiment 1 fundamentals anchor the stock price dynamics to 
some extent, and the market price fluctuates in the vicinity of the perceived fundamental 
value The average percentage bias of market price from the fundamentals is low and 
stands  at  -1.6%  (see  Table  A2.3).  Nevertheless,  the  valuation  errors  are  clearly 
autocorrelated – due to the market inertia and prevailing expectations, the stock price 
may  be  above  or  below  risk-neutral  fundamentals  for  extensive  periods  of time.  For 
instance, runs of uninterrupted overvaluation stretch on average for 44 trading periods 
and an average length of undervaluation runs is 60 periods. By the same token, average 
market price deviations from the fundamental valuation are large relative to the price 
volatility. The enabled evolutionary selection option in the model ensures relatively even 
wealth distribution among agents and each trading period active agents (i.e. agents that 
have sufficient funds and/or stock holdings to trade constitute on average 89.7% of total 
population).  Finally,  the  average  fraction  of  agents  whose  adjusted  fundamental 
valuations (reservation prices) fall out of modeller-imposed “reasonable” bounds is very 
low and stands on average at 0.1% of total population in a trading round. 
It turns out that the above results strongly depend on the evolutionary competition 
assumption.  It  suffices  to  disable  the  evolutionary  selection  (Experiment  2),  and  the 
average percentage stock price bias from the fundamentals boosts to 5.9% along with a 
dramatic increase in average overvaluation runs to 406. By the end of a simulation run 
the  number  of  inactive  agents  per  trading  round  increases  to  70-80%,  and  wealth 
naturally concentrates in the hands of remaining 20-30% agents. There are some possible 
explanations to this overvaluation and wealth concentration. Such overvaluation can be to 
some extent associated with the model’s feature that excess liquidity is simply taken 
away from the market, which means that the agents that tend to sell their stock holdings 
are more likely to “consume” their money and become inactive. In other words, those 
agents that highly value the stock tend to dominate in the market. Another interpretation 
is  that  worse-performing  agents  are  simply  driven  out  of  the  market.  Moreover,  a 
diminishing number of active participants and a smaller degree of competition allows 
agents to concert their portfolio rebalancing actions in such a way that the market price is 
driven up, which leads to larger unrealised returns and thereby stronger reinforcement for 





















































































































The largest mass of investors want stock prices to be as high as possible (though possibly 
still compatible with fundamentals), and it is not in their direct interest to have prices that 
match fundamentals precisely. 
We also perform simulations to examine market’s self-regulation ability. In particular, 
we want to know whether economic forces are strong enough to bring the market to the 
true fundamentals if they systematically differ from average perceived fundamentals. For 
this  purpose,  we  introduce  and  an  arbitrary  upward  bias  to  the  estimates  of  the 
fundamental value by adding an arbitrary term in equation (3). Then simulation runs are 
implemented for different model settings, with or without reinforcement learning. It turns 
out that the market is not able to find the true risk-neutral fundamentals. In the case of no-
learning, stock prices tend to slowly grow larger than the perceived fundamentals. In the 
case  of  enabled  reinforcement  learning,  agents  tend t o  s t i c k  t o  t h e  p e r c e i v e d  
fundamentals, and the market price fluctuates around them as a result.  
The  above  results  confirm  the  market  self-regulation  mechanism  in  this  model  is 
weak. We do not find evidence of agents adjusting their perceived fundamentals so that 
the market price gets in line with modeller-imposed fundamentals or, say, the usually 
assumed  risk-averse  behaviour.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  not  surprising.  Well  known 
puzzles of empirical finance and recent mega-bubbles suggest that markets may not be 
tracking fundamentals so closely after all. It can be the case that markets exhibit so strong 
inertia that even fundamentally correct investment strategies pay out only in too distant 
future and may not be applied successfully or act as the market’s self-regulating force. 
The obtained results suggest that (not necessarily objectively founded) market beliefs of 
what an asset is worth are a very important constituency of its market price. 
Figure 3. Typical relationship between stock returns and liquidity 
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Last but not least, we want to examine the relationship between the market price 
fluctuations and the financial market liquidity. This experiment also helps to shed light on 
the reasons for a relatively loose connection between the market price and fundamentals. 
In  this  simulation  run,  the  standard  model  version  with  reinforcement  learning  and 
evolutionary  selection  is  used,  while  dividends  are  assumed  to  be  deterministic  and 



















































significant  and trading  does  not  stop. The  clue to  understanding  this  excessive  price 
volatility may be the positive relationship between market liquidity and the stock price. 
Since unnecessary liquidity at the individual level is removed from the system, overall 
liquidity  fluctuates  in  a  haphazard  way.  Increases  in  market  liquidity  bolster  solvent 
demand for the stock and lifts its price. As can be seen from Figure 3, liquidity growth 
spikes are associated with strong price increases. The linear correlation between growth 
of money balances and stock price growth is found to be 0.32. 
It should be noted that the latter experiment is devised so as to ensure that positive 
relationship between stock returns (with dividends included) and investors’ cash holdings 
is not linked to fluctuations in dividend payouts,  as they are assumed constant. This 
allows us to conclude that liquidity fluctuations affect the asset price in this case, and not 
vice  versa.  The  evidence  that  market  liquidity  changes  can  move  markets  is  very 
important  for  understanding  the  way  liquidity  crises,  credit  booms  and  busts 
(deleveraging), portfolio reallocations between asset classes and other exogenous factors 
may affect stock markets. 

In this paper we developed an artificial stock market model based on the interaction of 
heterogeneous agents whose forward-looking behaviour is driven by the reinforcement 
learning algorithm combined with some evolutionary selection mechanism and economic 
reasoning.  Other  notable  features  of  the  model  include  knowledge  dissemination  and 
agents’  competition  for  survival,  detailed  modelling  of  the  trading  process,  explicit 
formation of dividend expectations and estimates of fundamental value, computation of 
individual reservation prices and best order prices, etc. Bearing in mind the uncertain 
nature  of  the  model  environment,  mostly  brought  about  by  this  same  interaction, 
strategies  followed  by  artificial  agents  seem  to  exhibit  a  good  balance  of  economic 
rationale and optimisation attempts. Quite a strong emphasis on the model’s economic 
content distinguishes this model from some other ASM models, which are most often 
based  on  evolutionary  selection  procedures  and  are  sometimes  criticised  for  lack  of 
economic fundament. 
Simulation results suggest that the market price of the stock in this model broadly 
reflects  fundamentals  but  over-  or  under-valuation  runs  are  sustained  for  prolonged 
periods.  Both  individual  adaptive  behaviour  and  the  population  level  adaptation 
(evolutionary  selection  in  particular)  are  essential  for  ensuring  any  efficiency  of  the 
market. However, market self-regulation ability is found to be weak. The institutional 
setting  alone,  such  as  the  centralised  exchange  based  on  the  double  auction  trading, 
cannot ensure effective market functioning. Even in the case of active adaptive learning, 
the market does not correct itself from erroneously perceived fundamentals if they are in 
the  vicinity  of  actual  fundamentals,  which  underscores  the  importance  of  market 
participants’ beliefs for the market price dynamics. We also find a positive relationship 
between stock returns and changes in liquidity – there are indications that exogenous 





















































































































Overall, this line of research seems promising. In our related research, we aim at 
developing a version of the model suitable for calibration to empirical data. This requires 
simplification of some processes in the model, taking steps to ensure more effective and 
robust learning, etc. The noteworthy implication of the proposed study is that similar 
modelling principles could be expanded and applied for modelling of other markets, such 
as markets for goods or labour. More generally, intelligent adaptive agents could form the 
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Reinforcement learning addresses the question of how an autonomous agent that senses 
and  acts  in  its  environment  can  learn  to  choose  optimal  actions  to  achieve  its  goals 
(Mitchell  1997,  p.  367).  More  specifically,  by  taking  actions  in  an  environment  and 
obtaining  associated  rewards,  a  reinforcement-learning  agent  tries  to  find  optimal 
policies, which maximise long-term rewards, and the process of improvement of agent 
policies is the central target for reinforcement learning methods. A good introduction to 
the  reinforcement  learning  techniques  may  be  found  in  Sutton  and  Barto  (1998), 
Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (1996) and Mitchell’s (1997) books, and some broad overview of 
reinforcement learning models is given in Kaelbling, Littman and Moore (1996) survey. 
In this subsection we present briefly some basic principles of the reinforcement learning 
methodology with a special emphasis on Watkins’ Q-learning algorithm, as it forms the 
basis of agent behaviour in our ASM model. 
The iterative sequence of agent’s interaction with environment is as follows. At time t, 
the agent observes environment state  t s  and acts according to its action policy to produce 
action  . t a   In  the  next  time  step  it  receives  numerical  reward  signal  1 + t r   from  the 
environment and observes new state  . 1 + t s  Finally, it is ready to update its policies (if 
necessary) and take new action  . 1 + t a  In the reinforcement learning problems it is also 
assumed that environment possesses the Markov property, i.e. all relevant information 
about possible future development of environment is encapsulated in the information 
about the current state and action. More formally, 
{ }
{} t t t t
t t t t t t t t
a s r r s s
a s r r a s r a s r r s s
, | ,' Pr
, , ,..., , , , , , | ,' Pr
1 1




− − − + +                (A1) 
If condition (A1) holds, such reinforcement learning task is called a Markov decision 
process. To completely specify the environment dynamics for a Markov decision process, 
it suffices to define state transition probabilities and expected rewards. State transition 
probabilities constitute a distribution of probabilities of each possible next state  ,'s  given 
any current state s and action a: 
{ } . , |' Pr 1 ' a a s s s s P t t t
a
ss = = = = +        ( A 2 )  
Notably,  in  a  general  case,  state  transition  probabilities  are  not  known  to  the 
reinforcement-learning agent but can be inferred from interaction with environment. The 
expected next reward is 
) .' , , | ( 1 1 ' s s a a s s r E R t t t t
a
ss = = = = + +        ( A 3 )  
As was mentioned above, learning is understood in this context as an attempt to find 
optimal policies. Here, a policy is defined as a mapping from each state s and action a to 
the probability  ) , ( a s π  of taking action a when in state s (if a policy is deterministic, 
then it is simply a set of deterministic rules describing how to behave in each state). For 



















































should be introduced. The state-value function for policy π  is defined as the expected 
discounted cumulated reward conditional on state s and policy  : π














k s s r E s V γ π
π                      (A4) 
where  π E  denotes the expectation given that the agent sticks to its policy  , π  and γ  is a 
discounting parameter. It proves very useful to define also the value of taking action a in 
state s under policy  . π  The action-value function is given by 
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π                    (A5) 
It is obvious that both value functions possess the Bellman property, i.e. they must be 
dynamically consistent. For instance, it follows from equation (A4) that 
( ). |) ( ) ( 1 1 s s s V r E s V t t t = + = + +
π
π
π γ                          
(A6) 
Since  condition  (A6)  holds  for  all  value  functions,  it  also  holds  for  optimal  value 
functions, i.e. those  associated  with  optimal  policies
1.  This leads  directly  to  Bellman 
optimality equations for the state-value function 
( ) a a s s s V r E s V t t t t a = = + = + + , |) ( max ) ( 1 1
* γ     for all s              (A7) 
and for the action-value function 
( ). , |)' , ( max ) , ( 1 ' 1
* a a s s a s Q r E a s Q t t t a t = = + = + + γ   for all s              (A8) 
The  most  prominent  feature  of  Bellman  optimality  equations  is  that  they  actually 
rearrange the multi-period optimisation problem into a problem consisting of a set of 
difference  equations  (one  for  each  state).  Notably,  if  value  functions  are  known,  it 
becomes very easy to find optimal policies. Equation (A7) implies that in any state s it 
suffices to take the greedy action (that is, concerned with only one period ahead) that 
maximises the expected sum of the immediate reward and the (discounted) next state-
value
2. It is even simpler if the problem is expressed in terms of known action-value 
functions  –  from  equation  (A8)  it  follows  that  action  ' a   taken  in  state  1 + t s   will  be 
optimal if it maximises the associated expected action-value function. To put differently, 
it is optimal to take actions that simply maximise each period’s Q-function value (such 
actions are sometimes called Q-greedy actions). 
The big question is, of course, how to find optimal value functions. One of the ways to 
do  this  is  to  apply  dynamic  programming,  which  also  provides  the  foundation  for 
reinforcement  learning  methods.  The  basic  idea  is  to  apply  some  iterative  procedure 
aimed at evaluating current policies and gradually improving them until they converge to 
optimal policies. More specifically, the so-called generalised policy iteration consists of 
two interacting processes: (i) policy evaluation, which is the process of finding the value 
function  for  an  arbitrary  policy,  and  (ii)  policy  improvement,  whereby  policies  are 
improved by making them greedy with respect to the current value function. 
                                                
1 Optimal policies are defined as policies that maximise state values 
π V  in all states. 





















































































































The policy evaluation procedure uses Bellman equation (A6) as an update rule: 
( ), |) ( ) ( 1 1 1 s s s V r E s V t t k t k = + = + + + γ π        ( A 9 )  
where  k V   denotes  the  k-th  approximation  of  the  state-value  function  ( 0 V   is  chosen 
arbitrarily). It can be shown that estimate  k V  converges to true policy 
π V  as k converges 
to infinity. Each iteration is a sweep through all states – the value of every single state is 
backed up using equation (A9). 
The policy improvement step is closely linked to Bellman optimality equation (A7). It 
can be shown that for every state s, the policy can be improved by taking action that 
maximises the immediate action value or, in other words, looks best in the short term 
(examining only one period ahead): 
                         (A10) 
The two procedures, given in equations (A9) and (A10), are implemented alternately in 
each  iteration,  and  the  iterative  process  continues  until  state  values  and  associated 
policies stabilise, which is when they become optimal. The problem with the dynamic 
programming  is  that  in  order  to  implement  these  back-up  sweeps,  state  transition 
probabilities 
a
ss P '   and  expected  rewards 
a
ss R '  (see  equations  (A2)  and  (A3))  must  be 
known, and it is very rarely the case in practice. 
A natural way to overcome the problem of incomplete information is to use sample 
estimates instead of expectations. This is exactly what is done in two broad classes of 
reinforcement learning, namely, Monte Carlo methods and temporal difference models of 
learning. In the remainder of this section we present just one specific temporal difference 
learning  method  devised  by  Watkins  (1989),  also  known  as  the  Q-learning.  This 
method’s principal back-up rule is closely related to Bellman optimality equation (A8) 
and is of the following form: 
.) ) , ( max ( ) , ( ) 1( ) , (
) , (     of      estimate New  
1 1
) , (    of     estimate    Old            
t t
t t a s Q
t a t
a s Q
t t t t a s Q r a s Q a s Q + + + + ⋅ − ← γ α α     (A11) 
There  are  two  differences  from  the  dynamic  programming  update  rule  based  on  the 
Bellman optimality condition. First, as was already mentioned, the expectations operator 
is gone – the actual realised reward and actual action value from the look-up table are 
used instead of the expected reward and expected Q-value, respectively. Second, the Q-
value in the look-up table is not directly replaced with its new estimate but is rather 
averaged with the previous estimate (which provides needed additional stability for the 
convergence to the correct Q function). The speed of learning, of course, depends on the 
learning parameter α  – higher values of the learning parameter ensure faster learning. 
Higher values of α  may be useful at the beginning of the learning process as the learning 
starts from arbitrary policies, or in nonstationary environment where the reinforcement-
learning agent needs to adapt faster and more flexibly. 
It was shown that under quite general conditions the update rule (A11) guarantees 
convergence of the action-value function to the optimal Q-function, provided all state-
action pairs are visited infinitely many times. The latter condition is needed to avoid early 
( ). , |) ( max arg 1 1
* a a s s s V r E t t t t
a



















































convergence  to  suboptimal  policies.  It  requires  that  the  learning  agent  continues  to 
explore the environment by occasionally taking seemingly suboptimal values so as to 
ensure that all actions in all states are sufficiently explored. Hence, the Q-learning agent 
follows  the  Q-greedy  policy  most  of  the  time  but  sometimes  (e.g.  with  prespecified 
probability ε ) takes an exploratory action, which may be completely random or oriented 
towards more efficient exploration. Such a behavioural policy is usually called ε -greedy. 
Figure A1.1. Basic Q-learning algorithm 
Initialise Q(s,a), s arbitrarily 
Repeat: 
       Choose a using policy derived from Q (e.g. ε -greedy) 
       Take action a, observe r, s’ 
        ( ) )' ,' ( max ) , ( ) 1( ) , (
' a s Q r a s Q a s Q
a γ α α + + ⋅ − ←
         ' s s ←
until convergence is achieved or process is terminated 
Source: adapted from Sutton and Barto (1998). 
Having discussed the basic principles of the Q-learning agent’s behaviour, now it is 
possible  to  describe  its  behaviour  in  the  procedural  form  –  see  the  pseudo-code  in 
Figure A1.1. Unfortunately, this simple algorithm can be rarely applied in practice. The 
reason is that it requires representation of the Q-function as a table with one entry for 
each  state-action  pair.  This  is  not  possible  if  the  state  space  is  continuous.  Even  in 
discrete real-world problems – and especially in the problem of investment behaviour 
modelling – the size of the Q-table and the computational burden associated with back-up 
operations are basically unmanageable. This implies that usually it is impossible for the 
Q-learning agent to fully explore the state space and it is necessary to generalise its prior 
experience to unfamiliar, but qualitatively similar state-action pairs that are of interest. 
Such generalisation is also called structural credit assignment – another important feature 
of the reinforcement learning. 
There are a number of readily available methods for experience generalisation. In our 
model we use the standard linear gradient-descent function approximation for the Q-
function, which we now describe briefly.  
The idea of the linear approximation procedure is to replace the representation of the 
Q-function  as  a  look-up  table  with  some  linear  function  and  iteratively  update  its 
parameters instead of updating Q-values for every single state. Hence, the estimate of the 
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), ( ) ,( ) , ( φ

  for all a.      ( A 1 2 )  
Here  s φ

 is the  1 × n  vector of state features, i.e. arbitrarily chosen variables that reflect 
the distinctive features of a given state. Matrix  t Θ  is the  m n×  parameter containing 
parameters associated with n state features for each of m possible actions. For more 





















































































































The gradient-descent methods seek to gradually adjust the current approximation of 
the Q-value toward its new estimate and the step size is proportional to the negative 
gradient  of  some  measure  of  current  deviation  (e.g.  mean  squared  error).  More 
specifically, for a given action a, the parameter vector  t θ

 can be updated as follows: 
, )] , ( [
2
1 2
1 t t t t t t a s Q v
t − ∇ − = + θ α θ θ 
 
  for all a,     ( A 1 3 )  
where  t v  is the new approximation of the action-value function and serves as a training 




 ∇   is  the  gradient  of  this  example’s 
squared error, i.e. the column vector of partial derivatives of function f with respect to 
elements of  t θ

. By taking the derivatives in equation (A13), one gets 
( ) , ) , ( 1 s t t t t t t a s Q v φ α θ θ
  
− + = +   for all a.     ( A 1 4 )  
The new sample estimate of the action-value function,  , t v  is obtained similarly to the 
basic  Q-learning  algorithm  (see  equations  (A8)  and  (A11)).  The  parameter  update 
equation (A14) thus becomes 
( ) , ) , ( ) , ( max 1 1 1 1 s t t t t t t a t t t a s Q a s Q r φ γ α θ θ
  
− + + = + + + +     for all a.  (A15) 
This equation forms the basis of the Q-learning algorithm, which is applied by artificial 
agents  in  our  model  when  forming  expectations  about  the  intrinsic  stock  value.  The 
detailed procedural form of the algorithm is given in Figure A1.2. 
Figure A1.2. Gradient-descent function approximation Q-learning algorithm 
Initialise  , Θ , s φ s, a  arbitrarily 
Repeat: 
       Take action a, observe r, s’ 
        s
T
a φ θ δ
 
− ←
       For all actions a: 
                ' ) , '( s
T
a a s Q φ θ
 
=
        ) ,' ( max a s Q r a γ δ δ + + ←
        ' : s a a φ αδ θ θ
  
+ =
       With probability  ε − 1 : 
                ) , '( max arg a s Q a a ←
       else: 
                Choose a  randomly 
        ' s s ←
until convergence is achieved or process is terminated 
Source: Adapted from Sutton and Barto (1998). 
The  gradient-descent  Q-learning  is  the  so-called  off-policy  control  method,  as  the 
value  function  backup  procedure  uses  the  highest  Q-value  of  the  resultant  state,  



















































Unfortunately, convergence to the optimal solution or its vicinity is not guaranteed for the 
off-policy methods. Nevertheless Sutton and Barto (1998) suggest that it may be possible 
to guarantee convergence for the Q-learning algorithm when the Q-function estimation 
policy and the action policy are sufficiently close to each other, which is the case if the 
ε -greedy  policy  is  followed.  There  is  also  evidence  that  these  methods  give  good 
practical  performance  despite  the  lack  of  theoretical  guarantees  of  convergence  to 






















































































































Table A2.1. Key parameter settings of the ASM model
General parameters
Length of a simulation run (number of trading periods in a run)  20000 
Number of simulation runs in a batch  10 
Number of agents  100 
Total number of shares  10000 
Frequency of dividend payouts  Annual 
Monthly discount rate  0.995 
Annual interest rate on bank account  0.062 
Liquidity ceiling (as a multiple of current stock price)  5 
Trading 
Number of feasible price quotes in a trading period  50 
Frequency of trading rounds  Monthly 
Trade cost (as a fraction of trade value)  0.001 
Learning 
Learning rate (alpha)  0.1 
Exploration rate (epsilon)  0.1 
Subjective discount parameter of reinforcement learning  0.995 
Dividend forecasting horizon  5 years 
Smoothing parameter in the EWMA of dividends, fundamental value  0.1 
Dividend forecast constraint (as a fraction of current dividend)  ± 0.3 
Individual  reservation  price  constraint  (as  a  fraction  of  perceived 
fundamentals)  ± 0.2 
Action  step  size  in  the  process  of  dividend  learning  (allowed 
percentage changes of the dividend adjustment factor)  -0.02; 0; 0.02 
Action step size in the process of reservation price formation (allowed 
percentage changes of the price adjustment factor)  -0.02; 0; 0.02 
Bankruptcy conditions in evolution procedure (and noise trading) 
Maximum number of bankruptcies in a trading round  3
Performance threshold (as a percentage of average performance)  0.7 
Threshold for strategy imitation 
Average difference between two compared strategies (as percentage of 
the leading strategy)  0.2 
Table A2.2. Specification of model experiment runs 
Dividend generating process (Model 1)  t t
t
t div div ε ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ = −1 0 5. 0 000125 .1 25
Dividend generating process (Model 2)  25 = t div
      
Model  Learning  Evolution 
Experiment 1  Model 1  ON  ON 
Experiment 2  Model 1  ON  OFF 
Experiment 3  Model 1  OFF  ON 



















































Table A2.3. Basic descriptive statistics of simulation experiments 
Experiment 
1  2  3  4 
Dividend forecasting     
Average forecast bias, %  -0.1  -0.1  -0.8  0.0 
Average absolute forecast error, %  0.4  0.4  1.4  0.1 
    
Price dynamics relative to perceived fundamentals     
Average price bias from fundamentals, %  -1.6  5.9  7.6  -0.1 
Average length of overvaluation runs  43.7  405.9  63.2  63.5 
Average length of undervaluation runs  59.9  2.9  2.8  62.4 
Upper semi-deviation (avg. overvaluation during a 
run above fundamentals), %  7.9  6.7  9.0  8.5 
Lower semi-deviation (avg. undervaluation during a 
run below fundamentals), %  8.9  1.6  1.8  8.6 
Average volatility (per trading round), %  2.9  2.2  3.6  2.8 
    
Behavioural and budget constraints     
Average proportion of agents  forming 
“unreasonable” dividend forecast (per forecasting 
round), % 
0.0  0.0  5.0  0.0 
Average number proportion of agents  that have 
“unreasonable” reservation price (per trading round), 
% 
0.1  0.4  3.3  0.1 
Number of active agents, %  89.7  29.2  22.2  90.5 
    
Adaptive adjustment     
Average dividend adjustment factor  1.0152  1.0162  0.9543  0.9979 
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